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After the establishment of shortwave broadcasts in foreign languages by both 
authoritarian and democratic regimes, the Spanish Civil War, which pitted the 
Republicans in power against the Nationalists led by Franco, became ‘the first 
great political event in which radio played a major part’ (Whitton and Herz, 
1942: 24). In fact, when the Nationalist uprising took place in Morocco in July 
1936, radio was already becoming a cross-border medium. The development 
of international broadcasting was then shaped by ‘the perceived power of the 
medium to influence public opinion’ (Hendy, 2000: 21). As a new technology 
that could cross borders, radio became ‘a major instrument of foreign 
propaganda’ (Quintero, 1993: 270) that attracted the attention of all those 
interested in its potential as a means of ideological dissemination. 
 
Beside its potential as a transnational medium, radio was also the first 
electronic medium to enter people’s homes, reaching individuals in their 
private environment. Furthermore, contrary to the press, which only impacted 
on those who were able to read, radio was a universal medium in the sense 
that its content could be understood by different publics. Against this 
background, the aims of this article are to analyze the role of international 
radio propaganda during the initial phase of the Spanish Civil War and to 
demonstrate how Portuguese broadcasters played a major role in the war, 
despite Portugal’s official position of neutrality – a position defined by the 
Lisbon government led by Oliveira Salazar, which had close ideological 
connections with the Spanish Nationalists. The focus on the radio stations 
broadcasting from Portugal is explained by the fact that these were the most 
important foreign broadcasters used to disseminate Nationalist propaganda 
during the early stages of the war. Moreover, the article will also demonstrate 
how the Spanish Civil War was a particularly important event for the 
development of radio’s potential as a conveyor of propaganda. 
 
The pejorative connotation that the word ‘propaganda’ still carries today 
already existed in 1936, since it had arisen after World War I when the first 
negative definitions of the word were created. It was then presented as an 
activity intended to deceive the masses, with its sole aim being to defend the 
interests of its sender, without any ethical concern whatsoever about the use 
of false information. For Harold Lasswell, writing in 1927, ‘propaganda is 
concerned with the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct 
manipulation of social suggestion’ (p. 9). 
 
Due to this negative connotation acquired after 1918, in the period between 
the two world wars the use of the word ‘propaganda’ was abandoned by 
democratic governments. It would, however, continue to be habitually used in 
countries under dictatorships that even developed organizations specifically 
dedicated to propaganda activities. Mussolini, Goebbels, and Lenin did not 
have any problem in using the term ‘propaganda’ to describe their attempts to 
mold opinion. In Portugal and Spain, neither Salazar nor Franco objected to 
the word. Moreover, in Germany, Hitler invested heavily in propaganda to gain 
and maintain power as the Führer, and propaganda became one of the 
foundations of the Nazi regime. As soon as Hitler entered the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) in 1921, his first task 
was to organize propaganda, which he considered the most important job in 
the party (Hitler, 1976[1933]). In fact, the central role of propaganda in Hitler’s 
rise to power explains the interest of the Nazi regime in assessing the 
potential of radio as a weapon of war. Such an assessment was done, not 
exclusively, but also during the Spanish Civil War, as described below. 
 
This analysis is founded on document-based research. The documents 
analyzed cover correspondence between the Portuguese state-owned 
broadcaster and the Head of Government as well as internal memos in which 
the broadcasts concerning the Spanish Civil War were problematized and 
discussed. Transcripts of the broadcasts were also used as sources to assess 
the editorial line of the stations under analysis: the privately owned Rádio 
Clube Português (RCP) and state-owned Emissora Nacional. 
 
The role of propaganda in the Spanish Civil War 
 
Propaganda acquired extreme importance during the Spanish Civil War and 
this was quickly recognized by both forces involved in the conflict. In August 
1936, the Nationalists created an office responsible for controlling the press, 
while the Republicans, who controlled the Madrid government, created a 
Ministry of Propaganda in November 1936. In addition to radio, the 
Republicans also used the cinema to disseminate their ideological messages 
through newsreels and documentaries. Campaigns intended to combat 
illiteracy and promote readership were also launched to acquaint people with 
the views of the Madrid government. Similarly, in August 1936, the 
Nationalists also created a bureau that was initially responsible for controlling 
the press. However, its powers were increased to include all types of internal 
and external propaganda, leading to it being renamed the National Delegation 
for Press and Propaganda. 
 
At first, the Nationalists did not control as many radio stations as the 
Republicans. Nonetheless, this did not mean that they did not consider radio 
propaganda to be crucial and, between July 1936 and February 1938, 
General Queipo de Llano presented daily talks on Unión Radio Sevilla, which 
was one of the first stations to come under Franco’s control. During this 
period, not only did Queipo de Llano encourage the Nationalists to pursue 
their aim of conquering Spain but he also tried to terrorize and demoralize the 
enemy forces: a technique that would be used later on by the Axis and the 
Allies during World War II. Furthermore, as highlighted by the war 
correspondent of the Portuguese newspaper O Século, Radio Sevilla and the 
Portuguese station RCP were the main propaganda tools available to the 
Nationalists during the initial months of the conflict (Nunes, 1936). The Italian 
Radio Verdad, which later on would have a crucial role in supporting the 
Nationalist forces, only started to operate in February 1937. Similarly, Radio 
Nacional de España (Spanish National Radio) only began broadcasting in 
January 1937. This station, which was controlled by the forces of General 
Franco, transmitted from Salamanca and was created with the support of the 
Italians, Germans and Portuguese (Quintero, 1993: 360–366). 
 
Hitler and Mussolini had officially recognized Franco on 18 November 1936. 
Both supported his revolt against the Spanish Republic in several ways, 
including through radio propaganda. The first transmitter used by Radio 
Nacional de España was sent from Germany, as mentioned in Goebbels’ 
diary: 
  
The supply of a large-scale transmitter is the correct course of action 
… Franco must send four men to Germany to be trained in my Ministry 
of Propaganda … We shall dub German anti-Bolshevik films into 
Spanish. I will invest more money for propaganda there … The large 
majority of the Spanish public does not comprehend anything of that 
which is occurring (Quintero, 1993: 355). 
 
The German propaganda strategist was particularly interested in gaining a 
comprehension of the role that radio could play in the mobilization of the 
masses during wartime, and the Spanish Civil War created a context in which 
this could be understood. Goebbels was already by then an enthusiast for 
radio’s ability to persuade the masses. It was his belief in the effectiveness of 
broadcasting as a means of propaganda that led him to state, in 1933, that 
‘what the press was to the 19th century, radio will be to the twentieth’ 
(Goebbels, quoted in Bergmeier and Lotz, 1997: 6). 
 
Taking into account the interest that existed at that time in the development of 
new techniques that could be used to persuade the masses, one might say 
that the Spanish Civil War functioned as a testing ground for World War II in 
respect to propaganda in general, and radio propaganda in particular. In 
addition to the broadcasts produced by both Republican and Nationalist 
forces, several foreign stations broadcast to Spain during the war, namely the 
Portuguese RCP, Radio Moscow, the German Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft 
and the Italian Radio Verdad (Ribeiro, 2005: 55–56). Only the Soviet station 
supported the Republicans who, in the meantime, were also involved in the 
production of anti-Fascist broadcasts to Italy, transmitted from Barcelona 
(Quintero, 1993: 364–365). The foreign stations that transmitted to Spain 
during the war had a relevant role in stimulating ‘hope or despair to those 
directly affected by combat’ (Deacon, 2008: 13) and, in some cases, did 
manage to influence military operations. In fact, radio broadcasting played a 
decisive role in the war since it was a crucial source of both propaganda and 
counter-propaganda attacking and denying statements made by the other 
side. While RCP and Radio Sevilla exposed false news aired by Radio Madrid 
and Radio Barcelona, the latter would uncover fallacious news disseminated 
by the stations that supported or were controlled by the Nationalists. 
 
A private station used for propaganda: The case of RCP 
 
As mentioned above, during the first period of the war, Radio Sevilla and RCP 
were the main stations undertaking the dissemination of Nationalist 
propaganda (Nunes, 1936). The latter was a privately owned station 
controlled by the Botelho Moniz family that was well known for its close 
connections with Salazar’s dictatorship. The founder of the station, Jorge 
Botelho Moniz, belonged to the military and would become a member of 
parliament during the 1940s and 1950s. 
 
Despite the fact that Portugal stayed neutral in the war that was taking place 
in its neighboring country, this did not prevent RCP from assuming its 
unconditional support of the Nationalist forces. During the Spanish Civil War, 
it broadcast pro-Nationalist ‘news’ and Fascist songs, including one that 
referred to the ‘Fascist saviour’, attacking the ‘destructive Bolshevism’.1 
Propaganda programmes were aired in Spanish together with military 
information, which proved to be especially vital during the first few months of 
the conflict, particularly as it was quite easy to tune in to RCP in the Spanish 
regions of Extremadura, Andalucia, Castilla Leon and Castilla La Mancha. 
Jorge Botelho Moniz himself frequently appeared at the microphones exalting 
the Nationalist forces.2 
 
On the first day of the Nationalist uprising in Morocco, RCP aired its first extra 
broadcast with an expanded news bulletin on the military operations that were 
taking place. It did not take long for the station to go further than simply 
broadcasting news. It began focusing on propaganda and on becoming an 
important weapon in the service of the Nationalists. Botelho Moniz explained 
in an interview in 1936 how he had decided to use RCP to counter-attack the 
statements being made by the Republicans 
over the airwaves: 
  
At the start, RCP provided the news unaccompanied by any 
commentary. Then we started to listen to the Spanish Government 
stations and we became aware not only of the scale of the movement 
but also of the Iberian intentions of the Marxists. Afterwards, the insults 
aimed at our country and at Rádio Clube Português started. We 
reacted, to show that we did not fear them … Thus, the ‘Reds’ were the 
ones that showed us the path to take (Nunes, 1936). 
 
This was in fact the period in which RCP started an innovative trend on the 
Iberian Peninsula: radio reporting. The fact that the owner of the station 
belonged to the military and fought on the Nationalist side as a volunteer 
enabled RCP to keep in ‘permanent contact with the front lines and to 
generate, from among the different battle sites, exact knowledge of the 
movements taking place on the different fronts’ (Antena 9, 1 July 1965). It was 
a real revolution in the provision of information via radio which had up to then 
been limited to reproducing the news published in newspapers (Figueiredo, 
1936). The war would effectively be the engine for the development of a new 
style of news reporting on the radio, which began broadcasting, with a slight 
delay, news items originating from the front lines that would also be reported 
later on by both newspaper and news agencies (Pena, 2009: 85). 
 
The long newscasts devoted to the Spanish Nationalist forces were closely 
monitored in the areas of conflict as they served as an important link between 
the various nuclei of rebels scattered throughout Spain. RCP would prove to 
be the only source of information and encouragement for many of these nuclei 
from the beginning of the revolt since the majority of Spanish newspapers and 
radio stations were controlled by the Republicans. In fact, the significant 
support given by RCP was soon recognized by the Franquist forces. On 8 
August 1936, the Portuguese consul in Huelva (a city controlled by Franco) 
reported to the Lisbon government the friendly attitude that then existed 
toward Portugal, which was mostly due to RCP transmissions (Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros, 1964: 104). 
 
The station’s extensive commitment to the Nationalist cause was not limited to 
the production of news bulletins specifically dedicated to the military 
developments taking place in Spain. During the first month of the insurrection, 
RCP made its position clear by ferociously attacking the Madrid government 
and all the Portuguese who hesitated in giving support to the forces led by 
Franco. According to the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, Claudio Sánchez-
Albornoz, the RCP broadcasts intimidated all those who were not openly on 
the side of the Falange: 
 
There was a time when this station was operating for 36 hours without 
interruption, using the same vulgar and insulting tone, not only towards 
the Madrid government but all the Portuguese who wished their victory, 
who it threatened, and threatens on a daily basis, to reveal publicly, so 
that the police may increase the already large number of arrests and 
deportations of Portuguese citizens who, in a cafe or at a news stand 
full of fantastic news, express their doubts regarding the truth of such 
information (Martin, 1995: 158). 
 
Curiously the ambassador had been at the RCP studios a few weeks before 
the insurrection in Morocco, where he gave a speech targeted at the Spanish 
exiles living in Portugal. He then appealed to their good judgment at a time 
when many were already involved in conspiracy movements against the 
Second Republic (p. 22). Shortly afterwards, the ambassador’s relationship 
with the broadcaster changed radically, and he would repeatedly protest 
against the tone of the transmissions. The Portuguese government would 
always answer his protests stating that it could do nothing since RCP was a 
private station. This was, of course, an ironic response since at the time 
Portugal was under a dictatorship and all information was controlled by 
censorship, forms of ownership and repression (Ribeiro, 2011). Furthermore, 
a few months before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the government 
had passed new legislation intended to increase their control over all the news 
disseminated in the country, which resulted in tight limitations on the liberty of 
expression (Pena, 2007: 36). 
 
Despite all the British pressure put on Portugal for it to stay neutral, Salazar 
never hid his satisfaction with the end of the Spanish Republic. It was in this 
light that Jorge Botelho Moniz considered that the RCP, by defending the 
insurrection in Spain, was mainly fighting for Portuguese interests. He himself 
assumed that this was how he perceived the role of his radio station: 
  
‘Daddy’ Stalin sent his messenger Tito to Spain, well accompanied in 
order to try to implant a communist Iberia. In this situation, Rádio Clube 
Português took sides. And this is when the true war of the airwaves 
started. But we did not take sides with any Spanish faction. We fought 
for Portugal and for all those embodying ideas common to the two 
countries.3 
 
The Nationalist and patriotic discourse was at the center of the ideology 
irradiated by RCP. Jorge Botelho Moniz, as a high ranking official of the 
Estado Novo, considered communism a threat to mankind and particularly to 
Portugal. This led him to not only openly combat communism through the 
airwaves, but also to participate in several anticommunist rallies that took 
place in Lisbon and Porto during the summer of 1936 (Santos, 2003: 64). 
Furthermore, he also became involved in the foundation of the Portuguese 
militia – Legião Portuguesa – and of the ‘Viriatos’: a corp of volunteers that 
participated on the side of Franco in the Spanish Civil War. 
 
The RCP news provided extremely important strategic guidelines regarding 
the progress of the Nationalist forces in the direction of Madrid. An 
emblematic example of this took place during the siege of the Alcazar of 
Toledo, where an insurgent group loyal to Franco was located. At a time when 
the stations owned by the Madrid government were already reporting victory 
in Toledo, RCP intercepted a speech by a Communist MP in Madrid which 
mentioned that Toledo had not yet been conquered by the Republicans as 
claimed by the stations in their possession. The Portuguese station rushed to 
air the news: 
  
The brave defenders of the Alcazar of Toledo have put to flight all the 
attacking ‘reds’. Foreign war correspondents in Madrid are prohibited 
from visiting the front at Toledo, to ensure they do not become aware 
of the daily series of defeats.4 
 
 It was a decisive piece of news in the counter-propaganda effort and gave 
new impetus to those loyal to Franco. As Jorge Botelho Moniz stated, this was 
the most significant episode in the participation of RCP in the Spanish Civil 
War: 
 
What impressed me most, to date, of all the episodes of this war was 
the undisputed fact that Rádio Clube Português will be forever linked to 
the biggest event of the war of reconquest: the already legendary 
resistance of the Alcazar of Toledo! On the day that the government 
forces savagely blew up the first mine at the Alcazar of Toledo they fed 
the red broadcasters the news that it had surrendered. As Toledo was 
not a key objective in the march on Madrid and the only motive was to 
arrive in time to save the heroic defenders of the Alcazar – General 
Franco ordered the suspension of the advance. This was when we 
intercepted a speech in Madrid by Margarida Nelken, a Communist 
MP, encouraging the militiamen departing for Toledo, which ended by 
saying: ‘Now boys, let’s go to conquer the Alcazar.’ Obviously if they 
had to go and conquer the Alcazar this was because the Alcazar was 
not yet won … Radio Clube broke the news, and the troops resumed 
their advance towards Toledo (Rádio Semanal, 28 November 1936). 
 
In a war of counter-propaganda, the information broadcast by RCP proved 
decisive for the Franquists. After it became known that the Republicans had 
not yet succeeded in their attempt to conquer the city, a Nationalist military 
unit led by General Varela moved toward the Alcazar and joined the rebels 
who were struggling to repel the forces loyal to the Madrid government. In 
addition to its reports refuting that Toledo had fallen to the Republicans, RCP 
encouraged the forces loyal to Franco to continue their struggle: ‘We have 
secure information to believe that the heroic defence continues beneath the 
ruins of Alcazar. And, if so, the flag of the “reds” will soon disappear’ (Antena 
11, 1 August 1965). 
 
This case clearly illustrates the value of radio as an instrument of counter-
propaganda. It was common, at various stages of the conflict, for RCP to deny 
news reported by the stations held by Republicans, including Radio Madrid, 
Radio Barcelona, and Radio Valencia. These, in turn, contradicted much of 
the information broadcast by the stations serving the Falange. This clearly 
demonstrates the real ‘war of the air waves’, which was then a totally new 
phenomenon. Before the Spanish Civil War, no one could have foreseen how 
important broadcasting would become in the development of military 
operations. But after the outbreak of the war, this was recognized by a 
Portuguese journalist, Leopoldo Nunes, who reported the advances of the 
Nationalists for the newspaper O Século and who did not hide his fascination 
with the role that was then being played by radio: 
  
Nobody foresaw, I am certain, the enormous and decisive role of 
broadcasting in the nationalist revolution. In between the records, the 
talks on literature or on science, [and] the concerts … and during the 
news bulletins … who could foresee that a hideous struggle … 
between falsehood and truth would take place? Who would say that 
through the wireless the world or even the Spanish in their own homes 
would be deceived or enlightened? How could one imagine that the 
news aired by ‘Rádio Clube Português’ would … save the stronghold of 
Toledo and its heroic defenders? (Nunes, 1936: 8–9) 
 
RCP’s support for the Nationalist forces remained unchanged to the end of 
the war, as it frequently reported on military movements and military attacks 
on Republicans, whom it dubbed ‘barbarians’, ‘reds’, ‘anti-Nationalists’, 
‘Marxists’, ‘Muscovites’, etc. The station, as a rule, emphasized all war 
atrocities committed by the Republican forces, especially attacks on churches 
and houses of charity, seeking to demonstrate that the war pitted civilization 
against barbarism, Christianity against atheist Marxism. This Crusade ideal 
was in fact central to the propaganda of Franco’s forces (Deacon, 2008: 14) 
and it was heavily echoed by the RCP broadcasts. 
 
The language used to characterize the two fighting forces was quite different. 
While the Republicans were regarded as barbarians who destroyed all and 
everyone that opposed them, the forces of Franco were generally 
characterized as having a strong human component, which led them to fight 
for the pacification of Spain, and they were considered true ‘patriots’ and 
‘saviours’. Such language was similar to that which would also be used by 
Radio Verdad after the start of its transmissions on medium wave in February 
1937. This station would become one of the most important sources of 
information on the Franco forces. Radio Verdad relied on ‘black propaganda’, 
hiding its origins and trying to lead listeners to believe that it broadcast from 
Salamanca (Quintero, 1993: 366). This technique would be used later on by 
several stations during World War II. 
 
Moreover, the use of readers from the countries to which broadcasts were 
addressed – a practice that also became common during World War II – was 
tested during the Spanish Civil War. RCP hired several Spanish speakers, 
two of whom, Marisabel de La Torre de Colomina and Santiago Tarodo 
Fortes, became well known for their performance at the microphone reporting 
on the evolution of the conflict. The former was particularly emblematic and, in 
September 1936, she was given the honour of appearing on the front page of 
Rádio Semanal, a weekly publication specializing in radio (Rádio Semanal, 12 
September 1936). 
 
Well-known pro-Franco Spanish intellectuals and officials of the Falange also 
appeared frequently at the microphones delivering patriotic speeches (Pena, 
2009: 78, 81). The use of Spanish nationals in RCP’s broadcasts had two 
crucial advantages: not only did they communicate in Spanish – solving any 
possible difficulties of understanding – but they also established a stronger 
relationship with their Spanish listeners, avoiding the popularization of the 
idea that they were strangers demonstrating against the Second Republic. In 
this field, the Spanish Civil War also served as a testing ground to better 
harness the potential of radio broadcasting as a propaganda tool. 
 
During the military conflict, the station also became known for organizing 
charity campaigns aimed at collecting donations to be sent to the Spanish 
population living in territories under the control of the Falange (Antena 14, 15 
September 1965). During the winters of 1937, 1938 and 1939, several 
appeals were launched for the Portuguese to help their neighboring country 
that was ‘fighting against the communist occupation’. 
 
RCP’s commitment was soon recognized by the Nationalist press. Less than 
one month after the military uprising had taken place in Morocco, the 
newspaper O Faro de Vigo published an article in which it exalted the 
Portuguese station and its founder: 
  
Among all these stations there is Rádio Clube Português, where a 
glorious retired captain of the Portuguese army spends hours every 
day and night telling Portugal, Spain and the world how the Spaniards 
are fighting, the advance of events, how the nationalist army is 
progressing, recovering and pacifying Spain and how all the nations 
are reacting to the event. This brave and glorious Portuguese military 
man sitting before the microphone in Lisbon has given over his brain, 
heart and soul to describing to the world how the Spaniards are fighting 
for the cause of civilization and culture of the Iberian Peninsula, placing 
his life at the service of humanity through radio … Portugal’s 
Broadcasters: You are doing a great service to Spain. You are letting 
the world know how the Portuguese soul vibrates with the gesture of 
the nationalists who inhabit our lands (Faro de Vigo, 14 August 1936). 
  
As recognized by Jorge Botelho Moniz, all the help given by RCP to the 
Falange received ‘the kind support of many official entities’ (Antena 10, 15 
July 1965). In fact, although the Portuguese government did not publicly state 
its support of the propaganda being undertaken by RCP, off-the-record, 
Salazar’s regime praised everything that was done to promote Franco’s 
victory. Moreover, despite the Lisbon regime’s attempt to erase from history 
the Portuguese involvement in the Spanish Civil War, after Franco’s rise to 
power, the role played by Botelho Moniz would not be forgotten, and he was 
paid tribute in Salamanca. 
 
Portuguese state-owned broadcaster: Praising Franco and promoting 
neutrality 
 
Compared to RCP, the state-owned Emissora Nacional had a much more 
modest role in the Spanish Civil War since its actions were tied to the official 
government strategy of non-intervention, despite the fact that the adoption of 
this position by Salazar had ‘less to do with principles and more with the need 
to avoid greater evils’ (Salazar, 1943: 313). 
 
In practical terms, the Emissora Nacional adopted a less biased standing in 
terms of news but, at the same time, it greatly increased anti-Communist 
propaganda. Moreover, the length of newscasts was increased in October 
1936 and later on, in 1937, a daily news bulletin entirely devoted to the 
Spanish war was created. These special bulletins were read by a Spanish 
citizen who had previously been working in the station’s music section (Abreu, 
1996: 130). 
 
All the news concerning the Spanish Civil War would be written in order to 
make it clear that the victory of the Falange was extremely important since it 
was usually framed as being the only way to save the Iberian peninsula from 
the dangers of communism. Emissora Nacional’s alignment with Franco was 
quite visible since, as mentioned by the chairman of the station in a letter 
addressed to Salazar, all news pieces considered inconvenient would not be 
broadcast. Nevertheless, contrary to RCP, and in order to avoid diplomatic 
incidents, on some occasions Emissora Nacional also broadcast news of 
advances of the Nationalist forces, which enabled the Portuguese state to 
maintain its appearance of neutrality at least at times considered more 
sensitive: 
  
It was my understanding that since Emissora Nacional was an official 
post, news about the events should be given so as to serve the political 
interests of Portugal … but in a manner that releases the Portuguese 
Government, prudently, from diplomatic complaints … So, having been 
the first to know of the disaster suffered by General Sanjurjo, we hid 
the news since it seemed inconvenient for us. On the other hand, we 
have avoided giving news of the rebels that seemed to us to be 
inconvenient owing to the complaints that could arise from the Spanish 
Government … Anyway, we could not mimic or even slightly follow the 
processes of Radio Club, however sympathetic they are from the point 
of view of our idealism … All news favourable to the Government of 
Madrid is eliminated.5 
 
In addition to the news bulletins, a daily ‘Military Chronicle’ was aired at 8 pm 
authored by Lieutenant Paiva de Magalhães who struggled to preserve some 
impartiality due to Portugal’s official neutrality. In 1937, he was replaced by 
Captain Alexandre de Morais who recorded his dispatches from Spanish 
territory. The talks were then impregnated with Nationalist convictions which 
led Alexandre de Morais to praise, whenever possible, the ‘pure nationalism 
that we must all follow, which does not look at ways but only aims to make the 
Homeland greater: “Portuguese Nationalism”’.6 Nevertheless, contrary to the 
editorials aired on RCP, the state broadcaster’s military chronicles used a 
more sober language, even though they did not hide the author’s ideological 
connections with the Falange. In other editorials aired on the station, the 
desire for Franco’s victory would also be openly mentioned. As an example, in 
the ‘Chronicle of international events’ broadcast on 22 August 1937, while 
commenting on Portugal’s position inside the League of Nations, the author 
made it clear that, although officially neutral, the country was biased toward 
the side of the Nationalists: 
  
The final victory of the forces of disorder that are stirring up trouble in 
Spain is today not very probable. But we do not have the right to 
exclude that probability, without encountering the most serious, the 
greatest of responsibilities to generations to whom we have the duty to 
pass on intact the heritage of national freedom.7 
 
Dubbed as ‘reds’, the Republicans would be criticized on several occasions. 
Moreover, Emissora Nacional always gave significant broadcasting time to 
anti-Communist propaganda in which the Communist regime was described 
as having only one objective: 
 
The sole enrichment of the State, with gold amassed by the efforts of 
factory workers, reduced to slavery, the most ignorant of forms of 
slavery … They’ll eat whatever is distributed to them and work 
continuously, with the only stimulus for work being to remain alive 
(Matos, 1938). 
 
Due to the Christian affiliation of most of the Portuguese population, another 
strategy used by the state broadcaster to disseminate the importance of 
Franco’s victory among its listeners was to describe alleged atrocities 
committed by the Republicans during the war, particularly those against 
priests and religious buildings: 
 
The atrocities of the Reds cannot be compared, even slightly, with the 
most barbaric acts committed by the wildest of peoples. Here are just a 
few examples: the communists murdered 180 people with axes and 
knives at Baena convent, including the priest of St. Maria Mayor, 
women and children. Two peasants from Malaga relate the murder of 
over 400 people, who were thrown into wells with weights on their feet 
or tied to the tails of horses and dragged through the streets. The 
communists burned 40 people in a closed church in Rosal de la 
Frontera. The special correspondent of ‘Journal’, Emile Gondroyer, 
states that the Reds locked 30 men, women and children in the prison, 
threw petrol through a window and then threw in lighted matches, 
burning everything. The archbishop of Tarragona and the bishop of 
Lérida were murdered. In Tarragona, eight priests were shot: the 
communists smashed the belly of a friar with their feet and then shot 
him. Priests were beheaded and their heads dragged through the 
streets. Often, children took part in the killings … In Barcelona, the 
Cathedral of Santa Ana was burned. The fifteenth century church of 
Santa Maria del Mar was destroyed. The world is looking at Spain. The 
wires run between Moscow and Madrid, and the target is a universal 
revolution.8 
  
While these chronicles indicated total alignment with the Nationalists, in 
internal reports Emissora Nacional would always mention that it was being 
quite impartial in its news coverage of the events taking place in Spain. 
Nevertheless, after the end of the war, several chronicles mentioned that 
Portugal, including its State broadcaster, had a very discreet but very 
important role in the outcome of the war (Rádio Nacional, 29 January 1939). 
By doing so, Emissora Nacional publicly assumed the double role that it had 
played during the military conflict: promoting the Falange and simultaneously 
being the visible facet of Salazar’s non-intervention policy that had been 
agreed after strong British diplomatic pressure. Moreover, after the war, there 
was clear interest in covering the action of the new regime implemented in 
Spain, which explains why news bulletins occupied 17 per cent of the state 
broadcaster’s programming in 1939, compared with the previous years and 
the ones that followed, when that percentage was always under 10 per cent 




The use of radio as a means of spreading propaganda and counter-
propaganda was tested during the Spanish Civil War since it was a 
technology whose potential was not yet fully known. Another new trail blazed 
by this new medium at that time was that it opened the way for the 
implementation of propaganda strategies that enabled countries to directly 
interfere in military conflicts taking place outside their borders. 
 
The case of RCP illustrates how foreign stations were able to take an active 
part in conflicts taking place in other states, spreading news of strategic 
importance to one side of the conflict and information that sought to 
demoralize the enemy forces. In the case of the Spanish Civil War, this was 
visible with the Portuguese stations, whose broadcasts could be listened to in 
most Spanish provinces as well as other stations, namely the Italian Radio 
Verdad and the German Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft (RRG). In actual fact, 
the immediacy of its action and the ease of crossing borders would make 
radio a potent means for the promotion of ideologies in the international 
arena. This capacity reached its pinnacle during World War II, when various 
lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War were used. 
 
One of these lessons was the use of nationals from the countries targeted by 
the broadcasts, which proved to be highly successful in creating a more 
intimate connection between the station and its foreign listeners. This 
technique, which is probably best known for its use on the RRG’s British 
service, clearly had a positive effect on how the broadcasts from RCP were 
received in Spain. Although in the case of Lord Haw-Haw the goals 
determined by the Nazi propagandists were not achieved, this lack of success 
had more to do with organizational problems and conflicting hierarchies inside 
the Third Reich (Doherty, 2000: 184; Doob, 1985: 127–129) than with the 
presence of British nationals or English native speakers (in the case of 
William Joyce) inside the German broadcasting service. 
 
Although the Nazi international propaganda strategy was not very successful, 
as has been demonstrated by many historians of the war, all the propaganda 
techniques used during the Nationalists’ conquest of Spain were followed with 
particular interest by Goebbels, who was very interested in understanding 
how radio could be used to achieve maximum effect in persuading and 
mobilizing the masses: two ideas that Hitler had placed at the centre of his 
regime. During the Spanish Civil War, it was almost impossible to draw a line 
between the truths and lies that were disseminated by radio. Both the 
Nationalists and the Republicans clearly recovered Napoleon’s maxim: ‘the 
truth is not half so important as what people think to be true’ (Marlin, 2002: 
57). This same line of thought was followed by Goebbels, for whom the 
importance of propaganda was crucial, irrespective of whether the statements 
on which that propaganda was based were true or false. 
 
Two other conclusions can be drawn from the role of Portuguese 
broadcasters during the Spanish Civil War. The first is that the military conflict 
that opposed the Nationalists and the Republicans made a vital contribution to 
radio developing its own news style, namely reports from the war front. For 
the first time in Portugal, radio used its potential as an instantaneous medium 
and news became something more than just the regurgitation of newspaper 
news. Secondly, and also important in order to understand the political 
strategy of the Portuguese dictatorship, it was also during the Spanish Civil 
War that Salazar tested his neutrality policy that meant giving in to British 
demands to not officially support any of the parties involved in the conflict 
while maintaining close relations with those with which Portugal shared 
ideological connections. While this was clearly the case during the Spanish 
Civil War, it also became a strategy that the Portuguese regime would adopt 
during World War II. 
 
As this case demonstrates, and despite the pioneering broadcasts in foreign 
languages by the Soviet Union that began in 1929, in the mid-1930s, there 
was a strong emergence of the use of media to spread ideas and ideologies 
that could reach large transnational audiences without having to deal with the 
constraints imposed by borders. Since then, during times of war, many 
countries have used both radio and television broadcasting – and more 
recently the internet – to persuade foreigners of the fairness of their political 
views. Several examples come to mind, namely, World War II, the Cold War, 
and the War in Iraq, to cite just a few. In fact, although the use of transborder 
media to win the support of foreigners and demoralize the enemy can be 
traced back to the first decades of the 20th century, it continues to remain a 
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